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ABSTRACT 
 
Confabulation, or the unintentional production of false, distorted or displaced 
memories, is commonly seen in people who have brain injury. However, it is 
most frequent in the acute phase, with persistent confabulation being 
comparatively rare. In this paper, we describe the case of Joe, a 24-year old 
man who showed confabulation in the chronic phase of his rehabilitation, 
three years after traumatic brain injury. We describe our approach to therapy 
for this confabulation, and in particular how collaborative formulation enabled 
Joe to understand his confabulation, and then to manage it effectively, using a 
diary and ‘detective’ procedure to identify whether or not evidence existed to 
support potentially confabulated memories. Furthermore, we include Joe’s 
own perspective on what it is like to be confabulating, and on his experience 
of rehabilitation. This is an example of a successful insight-based therapeutic 
intervention, which is rare in this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
also the first example of a first-person perspective on confabulation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Confabulation has been defined as the production of memories or personal 
narratives that are either incorrect or displaced in time, without any apparent 
awareness or intention to deceive (DeLuca & Cicerone, 1991; Fotopoulou, 
Conway, & Solms, 2007). It can be provoked (i.e. occurring in response to 
cues), or spontaneously produced. Case descriptions frequently describe 
clients’ confabulations as having “fantastic” content, that is, content that may 
be grandiose or strongly emotionally charged, but confabulations can also be 
subtle and include only minor factual errors (DeLuca, 1992). According to 
Nahum et al. (2012), there are four forms of confabulation. These are 
‘intrusions’, referring to intrusion errors in memory testing which can occur 
without any other form of confabulation; ‘momentary confabulations’ which are 
erroneous recollections in response to questioning; ‘behaviourally 
spontaneous confabulation’, which refers to unprovoked confabulations that 
the person at times acts upon, and is associated with disorientation and 
understood as a form of reality confusion; and ‘fantastic confabulation’, which 
involves spontaneous production of narratives that are incompatible with 
accepted notions of reality. Momentary and behaviourally spontaneous 
confabulations often co-occur, with fantastic confabulations being 
comparatively rare. Confabulation occurs after a range of different types of 
brain injury. It has been particularly associated with damage to the 
orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Turner, Cipolotti, Yousry, & 
Shallice, 2008). However, it is most frequently observed in the context of 
diffuse damage to the frontal and temporal lobes causing combined deficits in 
autobiographical memory and executive functioning, rather than in the context 
of focal lesions (Bajo, Fleminger, Metcalfe, & Kopelman, 2017; Diamond, 
DeLuca & Kelley, 1997).  
 
The intriguing nature of confabulation means that it has been the subject of 
much research. This research has largely focussed on understanding the 
underpinning mechanisms, and finding out what confabulation can tell us 
about the nature of memory, consciousness and our recognition of reality 
itself. Kopelman  (2010) reviewed the literature in this domain, and identified 
four broad categories of theory. The first was of context confusion, source 
monitoring or reality monitoring, theories with proponents dating back as far 
as Korsakoff (1889, translation by Victor & Yakovlev, 1955) and more 
recently, (Schnider, 2013). These focus on the systems that place memories, 
and thoughts more broadly, in context, with confabulation representing a 
failure at some point in this system. The second grouping was of motivational 
theories (e.g. Fotopoulou et al., 2007). These focus on a combination of 
personal biases of the confabulating individual combined with executive 
failures. The third grouping is of trace specification and/or verification 
processes, including work from Burgess and Shallice (1996) and Gilboa et al 
(2006). These focus on the executive processes involved in producing 
confabulation, specifically those concerned with the editing and suppression 
of false memory traces. The final grouping was referred to as “interactionist”, 
with examples being the work of Metcalf, Langdon and Coltheart (2007) and 
Kopelman (2010). In these accounts, the focus is on the interactions between 
the confabulating person’s imagination (i.e. their sense of self and creativity), 
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3 
autobiographical memory (i.e. their store of personally experienced events), 
and source monitoring (i.e. their contextual knowledge about the origin of 
information). 
 
Though confabulation seems to occur relatively frequently in the acute phase 
after brain injury, or in certain neuropsychiatric conditions, there are very few 
published papers on treatment. This is perhaps because confabulation tends 
to resolve spontaneously. One study, for example, found that seven of the 
eight patients with confabulation had stopped confabulating when followed up 
18 months later (Schnider, Ptak, von Däniken, & Remonda, 2000). Schnider 
(2001) also identified that the poor theoretical understanding we have of 
confabulation as a factor in the lack of treatment trials. The clinical focus 
during this acute phase is often on management. Schnider (2001) 
recommends an approach comprising four components: (a) risk assessment 
and risk management, (b) education for staff and relatives, (c) maximising 
engagement in productive activity, and (d) refraining from direct challenges. 
Ptak et al. (2010) conceptualise this approach as following the principles of 
errorless learning – by liming production of confabulated memories through an 
environmental/proactive approach, those memories are less likely to be 
erroneously learned. Fotopoulou (2008) makes similar recommendations, 
including staff and family education, avoiding direct responses (i.e. those that 
confirm/contradict the confabulation), and use of individual sessions to identify 
the meaning of the confabulations, and exploring this with the client in a non-
threatening way.  
 
A different approach to the treatment of confabulation, influenced by Crosson 
et al.’s (1989) conceptualisation of awareness of deficits after head injury, has 
been reported by DeLuca and colleagues (e.g. DeLuca, 1992; DeLuca & 
Locker, 1996). Crosson et al. (1989) considered there to be three levels of 
awareness of deficits in recovery and rehabilitation after head injury. These 
are intellectual awareness (i.e. knowing in principle that a given problem 
exists), emergent awareness (i.e. recognising the problem when it happens), 
and anticipatory awareness (i.e. being able to identify when a problem is likely 
to occur). DeLuca (1992) described an approach to the rehabilitation of 
confabulation based on the development of awareness, which included the 
development of a safe therapeutic environment within which to begin to 
explore the phenomenon and then gradually to recognise when it occurs and 
eventually anticipate when it will occur. Two illustrative case reports were 
provided, both people who were confabulating in the first few months after 
injury. DeLuca and Locker (1996) described this approach in more detail in 
relation to a 47-year old man who had prominent confabulation as part of 
anterior communicating artery aneurysm syndrome. He participated in a 
comprehensive cognitive rehabilitation programme in which, in addition to 
group cognitive rehabilitation sessions, included a programme of individual 
counselling sessions focussed on developing awareness of confabulation. 
The intervention was graded, including an initial focus on other domains of 
cognition before beginning to gently confront the idea that his memory was 
not always reliable. He eventually began to comment that his memories may 
not be correct and to check with others whether, for example, he had told 
them the same story before, indicating emergent awareness. The 
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confabulations ceased during the sixth month of rehabilitation and ninth month 
after injury, which the authors interpreted as evidence that anticipatory 
awareness has been achieved. No further confabulation was evident at a 
follow-up evaluation 18 months after the programme had begun. 
 
Burgess and McNeil (1999) described a somewhat similar approach in the 
rehabilitation of a 51 year-old man who also had a stable confabulation after 
the rupture of an ACoA aneurysm. His confabulation related to either having 
recently completed, or needing to go and complete a stocktake, which had 
been a significant component of his work. This person was thought to show 
some ability to introspect on this confabulation, as he looked for proof of 
confabulated events having happened, and when challenged he could 
achieve a more accurate recollection. The authors encouraged the client to 
keep a diary of events, and after having done this for a period of five weeks, 
the confabulation ceased. Burgess and McNeil also noted that this case 
showed an abnormally high number of false positive errors on a famous 
events test, including giving dates for fictitious public events. 
 
Comparatively less evidence is available on interventions for confabulation in 
the chronic phase post-injury. We identified only one case documenting the 
treatment of confabulation that had persisted past the first year or 18 months 
after injury. Dayus and van den Broek (2000) reported the case of a 46 year 
old man who, six years after rupture of an anterior communicating artery 
(ACoA) aneurysm, exhibited three stable delusional confabulations. These 
related to the death of his father, having had contact with his former wife, and 
being dismissed from his job. Several medication trials had failed to moderate 
the difficulty (specifically, this included trials of thioridazine, sulpiride, 
propranolol, and fluoxetine). Interestingly, the client’s confabulations were 
uniformly associated with swearing, so the authors decided to tackle this 
associated behaviour through an intensive, 46 session self-monitoring training 
programme. They found that the client’s swearing dramatically reduced, and 
that so in turn did his production of confabulations.  
 
In this paper, we describe the case of a young man presenting with chronic 
confabulation several years after a severe TBI, in which we used a 
formulation-based approach to rehabilitation. There have not, to our 
knowledge, been any reports of formulation-based treatment of confabulation 
published in people with persistent confabulation. However, it is well 
established that the development of awareness is a key process in 
rehabilitation more broadly (Crosson et al., 1989; Klonoff, 2010) and that 
collaborative formulation, i.e. helping people to make sense of their 
experiences, is a cornerstone of clinical psychology interventions (Johnstone 
& Dallos, 2013). There was hence a sensible rationale for taking a 
formulation-based approach to the persistent confabulation in this case.   
 
Our aims in this article are hence to: (1) describe a formulation-based 
approach to the treatment of confabulation in which the aim was not to reduce 
the occurrence of confabulation or confabulatory behaviour, but rather to 
reduce the negative emotional and interpersonal impact of confabulation. This 
is consistent with third-wave approaches to cognitive-behavioural therapy 
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5 
(CBT) which, relative to earlier forms of CBT, emphasise a shift in focus 
towards changing the meaning or function of symptoms rather the symptoms 
themselves (Ashworth, Evans & McLeod, 2017; Hoffman, Sawyer & Fang, 
2010; Kangas & McDonald, 2011); and (2) to present a first-person 
perspective on the experience of confabulation and of rehabilitation for 
confabulation. There is a growing acknowledgement of the value of service-
user narratives in enhancing professional understanding of the experience of 
health conditions and of health service use (e.g. Sweeney et al., 2009; Rose, 
2003), and to date, we do not know of any published service-user accounts of 
the experience of confabulation.   
CASE REPORT 
In this section, Joe’s own descriptions are given in italics, with commentary 
and therapist perspectives in regular font. 
BEFORE THE INJURY 
Before my injury I was an engineering student at a good university.  I was into 
various extracurricular activities such as rugby and rowing.  I also was known 
to dabble quite successfully in poker!  A successful company gave me a 
scholarship to help fund my degree. 
 
According to his family, Joe was outstanding academically, achieving top 
grades with relatively little effort. Joe himself is a more modest about his 
achievements. He had and maintains solid and close relationships with his 
family, including his parents, identical twin, and older sister, and a wide circle 
of friends. He also describes that his primary interests were social. He has 
some regrets about this now, seeing his exuberant sociability as a contributor 
to his injury. 
THE ACCIDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
When I was 21 and on holiday with friends, I took on a dare and fell head first 
from a second-floor balcony onto concrete.  This resulted in a fractured skull 
with bilateral temporal contusions. It was treated with a decompressive 
craniotomy, in which a part of my skull was removed to reduce intracranial 
pressure.  After 17 months of rehabilitation I finally underwent a cranioplasty, 
which really helped!  But, little did I know that that it carried a tiny infection; so 
it had to get taken off and cleaned.  It was replaced about two years after the 
injury, and it’s now in permanently. 
 
MRI showed a right temporal subdural haematoma, left temporal 
pneumocephalus, and bilateral temporal and frontal haemorrhagic contusions 
with fracture involving the petrous temporal bone. Joe was placed in an 
induced coma for three weeks, and experienced a period of post-traumatic 
amnesia of approximately eight weeks. 
THE LONG PROCESS OF REHABILITATION 
It is hard for me to tell you in great detail about my initial rehabilitation 
because large chunks of it have flown from my memory. However, I can say 
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that from my friends’ and family’s point of view, it went really well. I now 
occasionally volunteer at the same ward that helped with my rehabilitation.  I 
feel that I cannot have said that it “went well” because that is only in hindsight, 
at the time it must have been very stressful for my friends and relatives.  
Rehabilitation is a very long process and the vital parts of it for me have been 
done now. I can certainly say that my rehabilitation came along in leaps and 
bounds after my successful cranioplasty. I am not happy with how long I had 
to wait for this, and have heard that in some “celebrity” cases they happen 
much earlier on (e.g. the young woman Malala who was shot by the Taliban 
received her cranioplasty after 4 months and then began speaking). I also 
found that brain training was helpful in improving my attention. The most 
recent stage of my rehabilitation was going to the Oliver Zangwill Centre 
(OZC) for some fine-tuning, and it is this centre that encouraged me to write 
this account. 
 
Joe spent six months in an inpatient rehabilitation setting, and a further eight 
months in post-acute residential rehabilitation, before being discharged to his 
family home. He made a good physical recovery, was independent in 
personal activities of daily living, and participated in various creative and 
sporting activities with th  assistance of a support worker. He was seen by a 
community brain injury service for neuropsychological assessment 
approximately six months prior to his rehabilitation programme at OZC. At this 
point in time, three years after injury, it was identified that Joe had impaired 
speed of information processing (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales-Fourth 
Edition [WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2010] Processing Speed Index: 68, 2nd centile), 
memory (Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test-Third Edition [RBMT-3; Wilson 
et al., 20XX General Memory Index: 55, <1at centile), and executive 
functioning (Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome [BADS; 
Wilson, Emslie, Evans, Alderman & Burgess, 1996] Key Search profile score: 
0; Zoo Map profile score 1; Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System [DKEFS; 
Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001] Verbal Fluency Category Switching: 1st 
centile). He was not consistently oriented to time, but was oriented to place 
and person. His reasoning and sustained attention skills were reduced from 
the estimated premorbid level, but remained within the normal range (WAIS-
IV Verbal Comprehension Index: 96, 39th centile; Perceptual Reasoning 
Index: 94, 34th centile; Working Memory Index 95, 37th centile; Test of 
Everyday Attention Lottery task: 84th centile). The neuropsychological test 
data are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Joe’s family also asked for advice on a difficulty that had become apparent in 
the past few months (i.e. more than two years post-injury). Joe had begun to 
talk about events that had not really happened, but he believed strongly that 
they were true. The family believed he had been mistaking his dreams for 
actual experiences. This was causing Joe confusion and considerable 
distress, and his family were understandably uncertain of how best to 
respond. An EEG was ordered, which showed mild abnormality but no frank 
epileptiform discharges.  As such, one potential treatment option was to trial 
anticonvulsant medication. However, neither Joe nor his family were keen to 
pursue this while other options remained. He was referred to the OZC, and 
entered the holistic rehabilitation programme there soon afterwards, 3.5 years 
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7 
after his injury, at the age of 24. His initial rehab goals at the OZC concerned 
understanding brain injury and developing awareness to enable realistic goal-
setting for the future, along with increasing independence in travel, cooking, 
and pursuing further volunteering opportunities. 
 
Further cognitive assessment focussed on areas not assessed previously, 
which had potential to contribute towards the holistic rehabilitation formulation. 
As part of this, we administered a pair of unpublished recognition memory 
tests that incorporated confidence ratings, in order to explore Joe’s subjective 
experience of remembering. These tests revealed that Joe’s recognition 
memory for abstract verbal and nonverbal material was impaired and 
characterised by a response bias leading to a high proportion of false alarm 
errors (see appendix 1). It was notable that for several of the false alarm 
errors made, Joe gave strong confidence ratings, and appeared to have 
episodic-type recollections of these previously unseen/unheard stimuli. For 
example, for one word, he said ”Yes, I definitely I heard that one before. I 
remember not knowing what it meant the first time around!” This sense of 
certainty associated with a false recollection appeared to directly parallel the 
dream-reality confusion.  
 
There seemed to be no practicable method of testing the family’s hypothesis 
that Joe’s was misremembering his dreams as if they had occurred in reality, 
and from clinical interview, it did not seem that dreams were the sole source 
of his disputed memories. For example, they often included elaborated 
versions of events that his family confirmed had actually occurred. They could 
hence have resulted from Joe’s dreams, imagination, films he had watched, 
elaborated fragments of ‘real’ memories, or some combination of sources. 
This, combined with the pattern of performance on cognitive testing, lead us 
to understand the issue as a phenomenon not exclusive to dreams, but part of 
a broader phenomenon of confabulation.  
JOE’S CONFABULATION: A PUZZLING PHENOMENON 
Joe’s family’s description of his confabulations indicated that he would recall 
events that may have elements of real experiences, but that were knitted 
together with false information, and displaced in time. He did not believe 
others if they said they thought this memory was likely to have been a dream, 
and he could become frustrated with this. He also on occasion acted upon his 
confabulations, looking to find photographic evidence of celebrities he 
reported to have recerntly met, or to find his name on the credits of films he 
thought he had been involved in. The family also linked this phenomenon to 
Joe and his brother’s pre-existing interests in lucid dreaming (i.e. intentionally 
controlling dreams), which they used to do and enjoyed discussing with each 
other in the morning. This is of interest, as lucid dreamers show elevated 
rates of false alarms in recognition memory testing (Corlett, Canavan, Nahum, 
Appah, & Morgan, 2014). Corlett et al. interpreted this as a form of “reality 
monitoring” deficit, whereby the boundaries between externally experienced 
and imagined information are blurred. Confabulation had not been 
documented during his early or post-acute rehabilitation. His family reported 
that it had begun at some point after he had returned home from the second 
cranioplasty, more than 24 months after injury. Their opinion was that it 
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8 
started after his day-to-day memory had somewhat improved. Using Nahum 
et al.’s terminology, given Joe’s confabulations were (i) not exclusively 
provoked by questioning or conversation, (ii) sometimes acted upon, and (iii) 
he was not consistently oriented in time, he would be considered to exhibit 
behaviourally spontaneous confabulation, alongside momentary 
confabulations. Though the confabulations contained grandiose content, they 
were not “incompatible with common notions of reality” (p.2525, Nahum et al., 
2012), and as such would not be considered fantastic confabulation.  
 
Joe looked back upon one of his confabulations as follows: 
 
One example of my confabulations was that I sold a painting to the Queen! I 
have a very clear and detailed memory of this, and I am a very passionate 
painter.  However, there is strong evidence that it is a confab. In my memory, 
the Queen looked remarkably like my long deceased grandmother!  Not all of 
the confabulations are so easy to disprove, and these ones can be really 
confusing. They usually have elements of truth; in the Queen confabulation, it 
was true that a painting I did and sold for Headway [a brain injury charity]. 
However, the actual series of events seems to get over-dramatized to make 
sometimes an elaborate story with elements of truth.  
 
UNDERSTANDING CONFABULATION: THERAPIST PERSPECTIVE 
When Joe began the holistic rehabilitation programme at OZC, the 
confabulations were causing problems in two main ways: first, they took up a 
lot of time, and hence prevented him from doing things that were more 
meaningful and important to him. Second, they lead him to doubt himself, and 
even question his sanity at times, a source of confusion and emotional 
distress.  
 
To address this first issue and prevent the confabulation from taking up too 
much session time, the clinicians working with Joe used the strategy of 
reminding him in each session of the session’s main goal, and asking if it 
would be ok to focus on that goal, leaving the confabulation to be considered 
in mood sessions. This strategy worked well, and Joe was virtually always 
able to change focus.  
 
To address this second issue, Joe set a mood goal, which was “for the 
confabulations not to affect me emotionally”. The plan to achieve this goal 
was hence to: (1) develop a shared understanding (i.e. formulation) of the 
confabulations; (2) share this understanding with Joe’s family and team of 
support workers; (3) develop and put in place strategies for differentiating 
between actual and confabulated events, specifically (a) keeping a detailed 
daily calendar of events using Google calendar, and (b) deciding if a potential 
confabulation could be set aside or was worth investigating, and if it was 
worth investigating, to do so using a Sherlock Holmes-style procedure i.e. 
being his own detective and weighing up the likelihood of the event ever 
occuring. Using a “who, what, when, where and how” structure, he made a 
checklist with tick boxes and was encouraged to believe the event could only 
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9 
have happened if all the boxes were ticked; and (4) use these strategies 
consistently. 
 
As the psychologist working with Joe on this topic, I thought it important that 
Joe had access to a therapeutic space in which to discuss his confabulations, 
and in particular the confusion, worry, and frustration associated with them, 
and to do this in a manner that respected his experience, regardless of the 
veracity of the memories. It was then possible to share information with Joe 
about some of the counter-intuitive ways in which the mind works – that 
actually, our brains are always seeking to fill in gaps, be they in memory, 
perception, or language, and that false or distorted memories occur in all sorts 
of people, in all sorts of ways. The aim of sharing this information was to 
enable Joe to feel confident that confabulation was not a sign of “madness” 
and to begin to re-conceptualise his experiences, i.e. to begin to develop a 
collaborative formulation. The formulation in diagram format can be seen in 
Figure 1, and the letter written to Joe summarised our formulation as follows: 
 
“We learned that confabulation is a documented consequence of brain 
injury, particularly when there is damage to the temporal and frontal lobes. 
Cognitively, it is the result of combined changes in memory and in executive 
functioning. First and in terms of memory, the difficulty is having a sense of 
recognition even for new information, which we called “over-familiarity”. This 
means that your confabulations feel exactly like memories of actual 
events. The second bit is the challenge of thinking something through to 
determine whether or not it actually happened, something that is more of 
an executive task, and that does not come as easily to you now as it did 
before your injury. 
We also considered how aspects of your personality feed in to your 
confabulation. You have always had a great imagination, been creative, 
been interested in lucid dreaming, and loved story-telling. This contributes to 
how compelling and interesting your confabulations are! There are also 
many repeating themes in your confabulations - and each of these has 
several elements of truth. This makes them even harder to distinguish 
from things that have really happened.  
It was also really important to know that the confabulations are not a sign of 
“madness” or “psychosis” – we have this clear understanding of how they 
have resulted from your brain injury, and furthermore, you didn’t have any 
other symptoms that people with psychosis tend to have. 
Other things that we learned over the course of your programme were that: 
- When you are physically unwell (e.g. have a cold or the ‘flu), you tend to 
have more confabulations, and they can include more upsetting content. 
- Your twin brother sometimes has similar types of experience, where he has 
very vivid dreams and it takes him a while to realise whether or not they 
happened. This is evidence that confabulation is probably an extension of a 
normal memory phenomenon.” 
 
[FIGURE 1 APPROX HERE PLEASE] 
 
In addition to understanding Joe’s confabulation, an important part of our work 
was to develop strategies to differentiate between actual and confabulated 
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10 
memories. The strategies were a calendar for logging completed and planned 
activities, a key question to clarify whether or not a potential confabulation 
was worth verifying (if not, he was simply to identify a way he would rather 
spend time), and a “Sherlock Holmes” procedure for examining memories 
considered sufficiently important or troubling to warrant attention. The diary 
was comprehensive in its time coverage, but succinct in its activity 
descriptions. It was initially completed with a family member’s assistance and 
in paper format, before being transferred to Google calendar, which Joe was 
learning to use as part of his other rehabilitation goals. The Sherlock Holmes 
procedure simply involved using the Notes application on his phone to write a 
note of the memory to investigate, and then a series of prompts to weigh up 
the likelihood of the event having happened, by examining the memory in 
relation to the time in which it happened (using the calendar), using other 
evidence from his phone (e.g. pictures and messages), and speaking to 
someone he trusts about it. After this process had become incorporated in his 
routine, he began examining the potential confabulation against what he 
understood about his confabulations more generally, in terms of themes and 
structure. Once investigated, the memory was ticked off the list and stored in 
a separate section. 
 
UNDERSTANDING CONFABULATION: JOE’S PERSPECTIVE 
In my confabulations, actual series of events seem to get over-dramatized to 
make sometimes an elaborate story with elements of truth. It happens 
completely unintentionally, and feels very real. This links to my cognitive test 
results, which showed “overfamiliarity” in my memory for things that I hadn’t 
actually seen. I believe that overfamiliarity came naturally to me early in my 
rehabilitation, when my memory was almost non-existent. I probably had no 
idea that a lot of my memories may have been confabulations!  
 
Confabulation makes it harder to believe myself and forces me to question 
myself.  It feels like a lot of my precious time is used trying to investigate 
whether something did actually happen. I fear for my sanity, “normal” people 
don’t have to cope with this!  Am I just being stupid?  No; I am told 
confabulations can happen to anyone!  Personally, I hope that it may a good 
sign (however confusing that sign may be) because I’ve always been very 
imaginative and pre-injury I was quite fond of lucid dreaming!  A lucid dream is 
any dream during which the dreamer is aware that he or she is dreaming.  My 
brother and I used to talk in great detail about our lucid dreams. So I think that 
ability may have returned without intention.   
 
Good use of coping strategies has made it a lot less problematic.  The coping 
mechanisms are very simple: document everything!  I use Google Calendar 
and recommend it to everyone. Mine is called “Team Forrester” which lets me 
know all the family’s plans, including my own. If I need to check if a possible 
confabulation happened, I usually just check the calendar on my iPhone or 
ask friends and family to weigh up the likelihood of them actually having 
happened. The use of modern technologies is vital for this. If the strict 
monitoring system is followed, then the confabulations are much less of an 
issue. 
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When the confabulations have elements of truth, they are more difficult to 
investigate. One strong argument against their reality though, is that their 
general plot is quite dream like, and there are set of common themes. For 
example, there is always a bad guy, good guy, argument or embarrassment.  
 
The confabulations were more frequent and became more vivid when I was 
feeling poorly with flu and also when I was feeling a bit emotionally down.  At 
this time, they were also always more negative.  As soon as I got better the 
confabulations decreased.   
 
The hardest thing, but one of the most important things is just forgetting them!  
I do feel a bit crazy when it happens and a bit down while I investigate, but it 
is getting much better.  I see it as part of my recovery that I am able to assess 
my situation, and a good sign that now I am aware and can use coping 
mechanisms to try and restrict my confabulations. On the bright side, it also 
means that I have a very lively imagination! 
 
CONSOLIDATING JOE’S NEW UNDERSTANDING 
Towards the end of Joe’s rehabilitation programme, he began speaking to the 
other clients at the Centre about confabulation, and put together a 
presentation, “The Dummies Guide to Confabulation” (named after a popular 
book series published by Wiley & Sons) with the aim of sharing what he had 
learned with others. The idea for the current paper developed from this. Soon 
afterwards, Joe attended a talk as part of the Wellcome Trust exhibition on 
States of Mind: Tracing the Edges of Consciousness (2016), where he 
learned more about false memories and met another person with brain injury 
who had confabulation. This was a really interesting experience for Joe and 
his family, and helped to consolidate the things he had learned in his time at 
OZC. At a review six months after Joe completed his programme, he 
continued to use the strategies. Joe and his family reported that though the 
confabulation was still present, they all have a much better understanding of 
it, and it was much less problematic than was previously the case. There had 
been times when Joe has felt invalidated by people assuming that he was 
confabulating, but he dealt with this very sensibly by speaking with the people 
involved and asking them to investigate it if he personally did not want to or 
see it as sufficiently important to investigate himself. This worked well, and 
demonstrates the degree of ownership that Joe has over his confabulation, 
and increased autonomy in shaping his support system. At the final review 12 
months after the rehabilitation programme, Joe and his family reported that he 
now confabulated only rarely when he was over-tired or unwell. He also 
demonstrated high-level insight, for example on an occasion where he had 
misplaced his keys, and remarked that if he had still been confabulating he 
would probably think someone had stolen them.  
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we have reported on a case of behaviourally spontaneous 
confabulation in a young man several years after a traumatic brain injury, 
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12 
referred to here as Joe. We include his first-hand narrative of his experience 
of confabulation, and describe the psychological intervention we successfully 
undertook to reduce the confusion and emotional distress associated with it. 
We were motivated to write this piece to increase knowledge about the clinical 
presentation and phenomenology of confabulation, and to describe a 
successful psychological intervention. We think it is a good example showing 
(a) how theory can influence practice, as we used the evidence-base to build 
our understanding of the experience, and also (b) that abundant theory does 
not necessarily lead to improved practice. The latter is evident in the number 
of treatment-focussed papers on confabulation available, where there were 
perhaps a dozen of direct relevance, and only five case reports in four papers, 
relative to the hundreds of papers on theories of confabulation. We wanted to 
write this piece together as first-person perspectives in neuropsychological 
rehabilitation are rare relative to other health domains (e.g. cancer, mental 
health). We do not know of any other published report of this type. We hope 
that our joint paper will help clinicians to understand more about what it can 
be like to confabulate, and for other people in a similar situation to know that 
they are not the only person experiencing something like this. 
  
The approach to intervention we used is not likely to suit every person with 
confabulation. We think it was particularly suitable for Joe as he had a strong 
sense of curiosity about the phenomenon he was experiencing, retained good 
intellect, could remember key points from sessions with sufficient repetition, 
and had a very supportive family and home environment. Were these factors 
not present, a different management approach may have been warranted. 
Further, the cognitive underpinnings of confabulation can vary considerably, 
and interventions need to be tailored accordingly. In particular, it is obvious 
that the degree of amnesia and executive impairment will likely influence the 
type of intervention selected, and for people with severe amnesia behavioural 
management strategies are likely to be of greatest benefit. The important 
lesson from this work is that for those with relatively stable presentations, and 
in the context of a therapeutic relationship and sufficient cognitive ability, it is 
possible to increase clients’ awareness and understanding of confabulation. It 
is in turn possible for this understanding to reduce distress, make the difficulty 
more manageable by enhancing the uptake and effectiveness of 
compensatory strategy use, and even to reduce the frequency of 
confabulation. 
 
The type of confabulation that Joe showed is similar in some wa s to the case 
reported by Burgess & McNeil (1999). This case also showed a degree of 
insight, and found that filling in a diary helped him to realise that he was not 
remembering events as they had actually happened. However, Joe’s case is 
distinct in that his confabulations were more varied in content, and the former 
case did not come to understand his difficulty as confabulation, or become 
aware that it is an established consequence of brain injury that other people 
also experience. 
 
The intervention reported here shared similarities with DeLuca’s (1992) 
awareness-based intervention for confabulation. Both aimed to help the 
persons with confabulation to learn about their memory problem and to find 
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13 
ways of identifying when they were confabulating, alongside other 
rehabilitation interventions. Both hence served to initially increase Joe’s 
intellectual awareness (i.e. knowing that they confabulate), then to develop 
emergent awareness (i.e. knowing when they are confabulating), and finally 
anticipatory awareness (i.e. recognising in advance situations in which they 
may be likely to confabulate). Something that distinguishes this piece of work 
from earlier awareness-based approaches is the use psychological 
formulation as a means of developing awareness. Formulation is now 
commonplace in clinical psychology and neuropsychology but was not at the 
time of the previous published reports. Interestingly, Joe’s confabulation 
emerged much later on in his recovery than most of the cases who have 
participated in awareness-based interventions reported in the literature, all of 
whom have all been within the first six months after injury when treatment 
commenced. The one more chronic case, who was six years post-injury when 
treatment for confabulation commenced, was successfully treated but via a 
behavioural management approach focussed on developing awareness of 
swearing rather than of confabulation. 
 
Of course, this work has a number of limitations. We did not directly measure 
the frequency of Joe’s confabulations, and as such we rely on the feedback 
from Joe and his family in concluding that the confabulation has reduced. We 
did consider monitoring the frequency and/or content of the confabulations, 
but thought that the potential benefits were outweighed by the limitations of 
(a) not being certain about what constituted a confabulation given 
independent verification is not always possible, (b) wanting to give Joe 
agency over dealing with the phenomenon (rather than, for example, asking 
family members to provide ratings). Also, and as previously stated, our 
primary focus was on reducing the emotional impact of the confabulation 
rather than the confabulation itself, and because of this, Joe’s self-report is 
the most important indicator of outcome. Similarly, we did not repeat 
assessment of Joe’s cognitive functioning. This as primarily because we did 
not expect any changes in cognitive status to occur at this stage after injury 
except those that might reflect the adoption of strategies during testing. 
Another contributing factor towards this decision is that we do not typically 
repeat cognitive assessments at the end of a rehabilitation programme as part 
of our routine clinical work, given we subscribe to the philosophy that 
rehabilitation outcomes should not be measured by change in performance on 
cognitive tests (Wilson, 2003). Another limitation of this study is that we 
cannot be sure that the positive effects resulted from the processes of 
formulation and strategy use versus other aspects of rehabilitation, or indeed, 
experiences occurring outside rehabilitation or as a natural product of time. 
However, it would not have been practicable to conduct this particular piece of 
work in a controlled experimental manner. We think that each of these factors 
probably facilitated either Joe’s understanding of his confabulation, and/or the 
decreased emotional impact of it. 
 
There are other questions that remain to be resolved. We do not know if the 
elevated rate of false positive errors on memory testing, or “over-familiarity”, 
as we referred to it, was a consequence of Joe’s brain injury, or something 
that existed previously. This is particularly pertinent given Joe’s premorbid 
Page 13 of 19
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pnrh
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
14 
interest in lucid dreaming and Corlett et al.’s (2014) findings that lucid 
dreamers make more false alarm errors than controls. It would be possible to 
examine this issue by testing Joe’s twin, also a lucid dreamer, on the same 
memory test. Similarly, we do not know if Joe would have demonstrated 
impaired reality filtering given clinical versions of tests such as those used in 
Nahum et al. (2012) are not available. However, the findings from either 
examination would not necessarily be conclusive, and importantly, it is not 
clear that the intervention would have differed at all had we conducted further 
such investigations.  
 
When we met to finalise this paper, Joe made an astute observation, with 
which we will close this paper: in order to overcome any problem, the first 
thing is to understand it in detail, then you can come up with an intelligent 
solution. 
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Figure 1. Formulation diagram showing personal, brain-based, and cognitive contributions to confabulation 
(in the upper dashed boxes), our understanding of the experience of confabulation (in central solid-lined 
boxed), and its consequences (in lower dot-dashed boxes).  
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Appendix 1. Neuropsychological assessment results from approximately three 
years post-injury. 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Fourth UK Edition (WAIS-IV) 
Subtest Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile Classification 
Block Design 46 10 50 Average 
Similarities 23 9 37 Average 
Digit Span 26 9 37 Average 
Matrix Reasoning 20 11 63 Average 
Vocabulary 37 11 63 Average 
Arithmetic 12 9 37 Average 
Symbol Search 15 4 2 Impaired 
Visual Puzzles 8 6 9 Low average 
Information 9 8 25 Average 
Coding 35 4 2 Impaired 
WAIS-IV Index Scores 
 Index Score Percentile Classification 
Verbal Comprehension 96 39 Average 
Perceptual Reasoning 94 34 Average 
Working Memory 95 37 Average 
Processing Speed 68 2 Impaired 
Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test – 3
rd
 Edition (RBMT-3)  
Component Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile Classification 
Names Delayed Recall 0 3 1 Impaired 
Belongings Delayed Recall 3 2 0.4 Impaired 
Appointments Delayed Recall 1 5 5 Borderline 
Picture Recognition 15 11 63 Average 
Story Immediate Recall 3.5 6 9 Low Average 
Story Delayed Recall 0 1 0.1 Impaired 
Face Recognition 3 1 0.1 Impaired 
Route Immediate Recall 7 3 1 Impaired 
Route Delayed Recall 4 1 0.1 Impaired 
Messages Immediate Recall 2 2 0.4 Impaired 
Messages Delayed Recall 4 5 5 Borderline 
Orientation and Date 10.5 4 2 Borderline 
Novel Task Immediate Recall 15 3 1 Impaired 
Novel Task Delayed Recall 4 2 0.4 Impaired 
General Memory Index 49 55 0.1 Impaired 
Test of Everyday Attention 
 Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile  Classification 
Map Search 1 36 7 16 Low average 
Elevator Counting 7/7 n/a n/a Normal range 
Lottery 10 13 84 High average 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (DKEFS) Verbal Fluency 
Component Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile Classification 
Letter Fluency 26 7 16 Low Average 
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Category Fluency 35 9 37 Average 
Category Switching 8 3 1 Impaired 
Category Switching Accuracy 7 5 5 Borderline 
DKEFS Color Word Interference 
Component Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile Classification 
Colour naming 34 7 16 Low Average 
Word reading 30 5 5 Borderline 
Inhibition 50 10 50 Average 
Inhibition/switching 70 7 16 Low Average 
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) 
Component Profile Score Interpretation 
Key Search 0 Impaired 
Zoo Map 1 Impaired 
Hotel Test (Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt, & Robertson, 2002) 
Component Raw Score Interpretation 
Tasks Completed 2/5 
Out of normal range based on 
Manly et al (2002). 
Cleveland Verbal Working Memory Test with Interference (Mack, unpublished) 
Component Raw Score Scaled Score Percentile Classification 
Trigram Recall 37 +.07 50 Average 
Reverse Counting 8.2 -1.48 7 Borderline 
Cleveland Recognition Memory Tests (Mack, unpublished) 
Component Sensitivity (d’) 
Response bias 
(C) 
Interpretation 
Visual-nonverbal first half -.143 -.511 
Poor sensitivity, slight improvement 
in second half, liberal response 
bias Visual-nonverbal second half 0.272 -1.09 
Auditory-verbal first half 1.075 -.689 Initially reasonable sensitivity, 
deterioration in second half, liberal 
response bias Auditory-verbal second half 0.332 -.606 
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